Yet again, Kenya is facing impending drought, and the drylands are already bearing the brunt. Around 3 million people are currently affected, and it is likely the situation will get worse over the coming months……..
Water and pasture is already in short supply – and as livestock get weaker and their market value decreases, pastoralists have less income to buy food. Malnutrition is rising as families skip meals, take on debts to buy food, and weak cattle are unable to produce vital milk. Families are withdrawing children from school as they migrate with their cattle to find water.
But why does a regular and predictable event like drought always lead to disaster? It’s because too often the response and the media coverage comes too late – after disaster has already struck, when people are hungry and cattle are dying – rather than addressing the issues that make people vulnerable in the first place. Exacerbated by a changing climate, drought is currently inevitable in Kenya. However it is not inevitable that people starve and thousands of animals die as a result.
Why wait until it is too late? With the right action at the right time, hazards such as drought will not always result in disaster, and lives and livelihoods can be saved. The Kenyan government, aid agencies, donors and the media urgently need to re-assess how Kenya deals with drought.
What makes the drylands so vulnerable?
It is not a coincidence that the drylands are the areas most affected by droughts.
Negative perceptions and stereotypes of pastoralist livelihoods persist, with the result that many people believe pastoralism itself increases vulnerability. In fact, pastoralism is a highly adaptable and resilient way of living that makes use of limited natural resources in areas that receive little rainfall. However, there are five key underlying issues that undermine this livelihood. With the right political will, these can be addressed:
1. Failure to invest in the drylands’ economy The economic potential of the drylands – also known as the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) – is enormous. According to Kenyan government figures, the livestock sector contributes about 12 percent of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 40 percent of the agricultural GDP, and employs 50 percent of the country’s agricultural workforce.
The ASALs support around six million people, or 15 percent of Kenya’s population, yet the government’s budget allocation to the livestock sector is only around one percent of the national budget. While Kenya’s coffee and tea producers receive major support and subsidies, livestock keepers receive comparatively little help. The livestock sector receives only a fifth of agricultural investment, and even within the livestock sector, the ASALs are neglected: While 75 percent of Kenya’s livestock are in the ASALs, they are served by fewer than 10 percent of livestock service staff.
There is little money for development or opening the regions up for investment. Demand for meat and dairy products is increasing nationally and internationally, yet the ASALs are not benefiting from this opportunity.
2. A lack of development and basic services
The ASALs have suffered decades of neglect that have a profound impact on the situation today. These regions are the most under-served in terms of roads and basic services such as water, healthcare, education and electricity. This limits access to national and international markets, and makes people in the drylands more vulnerable to hazards such as droughts and floods.
The drylands are the poorest regions of Kenya. 95 percent of people in Turkana live below the poverty line, compared to a national average of 53 percent. Other ASAL regions such as Marsabit (92%), Mandera (89%) and Wajir (84%) are also far poorer than average.
3. Poor policies, and slow implementation of good ones
Pastoralist communities have adopted their own strategies for coping with the environmental challenges, such as communal land management, seasonal mobility, and the zoning of rangelands for dry and wet season grazing. However, these have been undermined by government policies that have tended to allocate pastoral land – particularly prime dry-season grazing areas – for other uses, such as agriculture, new settlements, game reserves and mining. This has had a devastating impact on pastoralists’ ability to cope with drought.
For example, the Kenyan government has already given tenure rights and ownership of 40,000 hectares of Delta land to the Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA) and the Mumias Sugar Company, to convert the land into a monoculture sugar cane plantation. Over 25,000 people living in 30 villages stand to be evicted from their ancestral land as a result.
While on paper there has been an improvement in recent years in the policies and institutional frameworks for developing the drylands and building the resilience of pastoralist communities, in reality most have not been implemented and drafts have not been finalized. This begs the question, why not?
Some key policies that remain in draft form include: the proposed Disaster Management Policy; the establishment of the Drought/Disaster Management Authority and Contingency Fund; the ASAL Development Policy; and also flagship projects included in the government’s Vision 2030. Without good policies and legal and institutional frameworks, government budget allocation to the drylands is constrained.
4. Late and inappropriate responses
Effectively dealing with drought is possible, but only if we are better prepared. Resources need to be pre-positioned in locations where they are likely to be needed – however this is rarely the case. Often, even when early warning information and contingency plans are available and the drought is predicted well in advance, the response is still late. Accessing government and donor funds in advance of the disaster often takes too long because of the overly slow and bureaucratic procedures – which ultimately costs lives.
Too often the response to drought begins when people run out of food. In fact, there are four phases (see table below) – by putting more emphasis and investment in phases 1 and 2, there is less chance of reaching the emergency phase. Long-term development and emergency aid are two sides of the same coin. This approach is known as Drought Cycle Management, and each of the four phases requires different actions:
Phase Situation Actions needed
1. Normal Good rainfall. Pasture and water available Development: Infrastructure development such as water points, grain reserves, roads and healthcare facilities; Building the capacity of local organisations to lobby and secure their rights
2. Alert/Alarm Pasture deteriorates; depleted water levels Preparedness: Livestock vaccinations and destocking (buying up animals before they get too weak); Stockpiling cereals/grains; repairing old water boreholes
3. Emergency People struggling to find food and water, livestock dying Relief: Food aid; emergency healthcare (for humans and animals); trucking in water
4. Recovery Rainfall – improved pasture and water Reconstruction: Repairing water infrastructure such as dams and boreholes; restocking animals
5. Poor co-ordination at local level While it is vital for effectively managing drought that many different actors play a role – from the government to international NGOs, civil society to donors – the long-term responses are often uncoordinated. This leads to the duplication of interventions, a lack of accurate and comprehensive information sharing, and poor linkages between national and local levels.
While local level structures are in place, currently in the form of the District Steering Groups, line ministries and sectors are often poorly represented and the groups are often not pro-active in communicating and advocating for the right assistance at higher levels. Contingency planning often lacks focus and prioritisation of needs, and without local level contingency funds, ends up being an unattainable wish list rather than a guide to action.
Solutions: Recommendations to the government and donors
The government, donors and humanitarian agencies must tackle the underlying causes of vulnerability to disasters, particularly given the likely increase in frequency and intensity of drought due to climate change. Key recommendations include:
The government should urgently increase investment in the livestock sector, including improving infrastructure and disease control.
The government should redress the unequal provision of basic services and utilities in the ASALs, and ensure development in the region.
The government should prioritise finalising and implementing key draft policies and institutional bodies that would help to better deal with the crisis and long-term needs.
All actors should base their responses on the Drought Cycle Management approach, ensuring that priority is given to preparing in advance for droughts and building communities’ ability to cope, not just responding to emergencies. Governments and donors need to provide long-term flexible funding to ensure this, and provide easily accessible contingency funds.
NGOs should work closely with government and other agencies to develop models of good practice, and ensure these are used and implemented
The government urgently needs to strengthen local level co-ordination, now and for the future, and ensure that government line sectors are engaged in focused and realistic joint preparedness and response planning.
The Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities (REGLAP) is a regional project funded by European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) under the Drought Cycle Management Decision. It is implemented by a consortium consisting of Oxfam GB, RECONCILE, Cordaid, Care International, Save the Children UK and VSF Belgium.
For more information visit: http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastafrica/
(edited to suite CISA’s style)
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
OPINION: If The Opposition Won The Ugandan Polls, Would The Kabaka Get The «Federo» He Seeks?
By Dominic Vincent Nkoyoyo*
Looking at the Ugandan political scene, it is clear that the dominant figures in Ugandan politics right now are : Yoweri Museveni the current President and the Kabaka of Buganda Ronald Mutebi. It is also evindent that there is almost endless tension between them!
The cause of this tension is Museveni’s rejection of the Kabaka’s demand for «Federo» ( a federal system of government.) The Ugandan news paper The Monitor of August 17, 2009 in article entitled: Kabaka Renews Federo demand, expresses this tension, «Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi of Buganda said yesterday that his kingdom will keep demanding a federal system of government, despite President Museveni’s view that debate on the matter is closed.»
The Uganda government owned news paper New Vision, of January 8, 2011 in article entitled, Movement MPs okay King’s Bill also highlights the tension between the Central government and Mengo (the seat of the Buganda government); it says, «The people in Mengo cannot purport to turn themselves into the Parliament of Uganda. The Constitution is clear, as it gives who makes the laws of Uganda, Mengo can send representatives to make petitions, which will be listened to on their merit.» the articles goes on to say, «…the President repeated his earlier comments that the Kabaka does not answer his phone calls since their meeting last year.»
The opposition is now politically exploiting this tension to win the support of Buganda come the elections in February this year! And the Uganda news paper The Monitor of Saturday January 8, 2011 in an article entitled, Opposition parties promise federo as 2011 polls near says, «With promising federal, the opposition is likely to win the support of mainly Buganda kingdom which has for long agitated for the arrangement which Museveni says is similar to the regional tier system his government is pushing.»
But the important question right now for any politically minded person which probably the Kabaka supporters have not asked themselves is : «If the Opposition won this year’s Ugandan elections would the Kabaka get the federo he seeks or demands?» It is true the Opposition parties are promising federo, but we should not forget that it is one thing to make promises and totally another to live up to them! And we all know how empty politicians’ promises can be! Is the Kabaka really sure that if the Opposition won this year’s elections it would give him the federo he demands?
It is not an exaggeration to say that in the whole country it is basically Buganda which is demanding a federal system of government! And it is clear that not all Baganda are behind the Kabaka’s demand for federo. For there are still very many Baganda in Museveni’s NRM!
In my view, I find it politically very difficult to see how the Opposition if it won this year’s elections, would give in to the Kabaka’s demand of federo! If this demand came from every corner of the country, that would put pressure on the Opposition to honour its promise. But it is clear that very few people out side Buganda would support the Kabaka’s federo demand even if a referedum was held on the matter.
For anybody familiar with Ugandan political history knows very well that Buganda does not have a very good reputation among other tribes. During colonial times, Buganda was a very great friend of the British! And it was through and with the help of Buganda that the British conquered the rest of the country and colonized it! So in most parts of Uganda, Buganda is identical or almost identical to the British oppressors! So it is very unlikely that the people there would give support the Kabaka’s demand for federo.
And what makes matters more complicated is that, reading between the lines, behind the federo demand, Buganda is really seeking «secession!» It is very clear that around the time of Uganda’s independence, Buganda never wanted to be part of Uganda. And to this end Buganda sent at least more than one Memoranda to the authorities in Britain! In September 1960, the Kabaka’s Lukiiko or parliament, presented a Memorandum to Queen Elizabeth II seeking Buganda’s independence! This Memorandum in part reads : «The Lukiiko’s Memorandum which explains in detail the constitutional plan for an independent Buganda is being prepared and will shortly be forwarded to Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom. We intend to divide this Memorandum into three main parts : a) Geographical and Historical background of Buganda; b) Buganda’s reasons for going it alone; and c) the Constitutional Plan.» Buganda still wants to go it alone! This should at least in part explain why Museveni cannot accept federo.
Buganda is the most developed region in Uganda and it is in fact the heart of the nation. The Administrative and Commercial Capital Kampala is in Buganda! Which political leader in his senses can accept the secession of the most important part of his country? So in my opinion even if the Opposition won this year’s Uganda elections, it would not give in to the Kabaka’s demand for federo! The Opposition is just exploiting the federo demand just to win the Buganda votes and so get itself in power. But it is unfortunate the Kabaka does not seem to see that they are just playing with him! After getting into power they would tell him exactly what Museveni has told him, «No Federo!»
So it is high time that Buganda woke up from the illusion and dream of federo at least at this point in history! The Kabaka’s political adivisers who advise him to insist on federo are not helping him. They are men seeking their own interests! And unfortunately many of the religious leaders who could have advised him better and also acted as a bridge between him and Museveni, they too appear to be consumed up by the desire for secession instead of unity of the country!
For sure the Kabaka being a citizen of Uganda, all his rights should be respected and he should not suffer any oppression from the Central government. And his complaints should be listened to. But it cannot be expected that every demand he makes has to be granted.
Anyone can see that the secession of Southern Sudan from the North is reasonable given the injustices and oppression suffered by the southerners over the years. But it is very difficult to see how the secession of Buganda from the rest of the country can be justified! If it is just because some Baganda and the Kabaka himself feel that he (the Kabaka) should have political power and restore a sense of pride they had in the past, that is really the wrong reason for divinding the country! No part of the country should be allowed to secede simply because some people want to have political power!
*Dominic Vincent Nkoyoyo, Monastery Val Notre-Dame, Canada.
Looking at the Ugandan political scene, it is clear that the dominant figures in Ugandan politics right now are : Yoweri Museveni the current President and the Kabaka of Buganda Ronald Mutebi. It is also evindent that there is almost endless tension between them!
The cause of this tension is Museveni’s rejection of the Kabaka’s demand for «Federo» ( a federal system of government.) The Ugandan news paper The Monitor of August 17, 2009 in article entitled: Kabaka Renews Federo demand, expresses this tension, «Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi of Buganda said yesterday that his kingdom will keep demanding a federal system of government, despite President Museveni’s view that debate on the matter is closed.»
The Uganda government owned news paper New Vision, of January 8, 2011 in article entitled, Movement MPs okay King’s Bill also highlights the tension between the Central government and Mengo (the seat of the Buganda government); it says, «The people in Mengo cannot purport to turn themselves into the Parliament of Uganda. The Constitution is clear, as it gives who makes the laws of Uganda, Mengo can send representatives to make petitions, which will be listened to on their merit.» the articles goes on to say, «…the President repeated his earlier comments that the Kabaka does not answer his phone calls since their meeting last year.»
The opposition is now politically exploiting this tension to win the support of Buganda come the elections in February this year! And the Uganda news paper The Monitor of Saturday January 8, 2011 in an article entitled, Opposition parties promise federo as 2011 polls near says, «With promising federal, the opposition is likely to win the support of mainly Buganda kingdom which has for long agitated for the arrangement which Museveni says is similar to the regional tier system his government is pushing.»
But the important question right now for any politically minded person which probably the Kabaka supporters have not asked themselves is : «If the Opposition won this year’s Ugandan elections would the Kabaka get the federo he seeks or demands?» It is true the Opposition parties are promising federo, but we should not forget that it is one thing to make promises and totally another to live up to them! And we all know how empty politicians’ promises can be! Is the Kabaka really sure that if the Opposition won this year’s elections it would give him the federo he demands?
It is not an exaggeration to say that in the whole country it is basically Buganda which is demanding a federal system of government! And it is clear that not all Baganda are behind the Kabaka’s demand for federo. For there are still very many Baganda in Museveni’s NRM!
In my view, I find it politically very difficult to see how the Opposition if it won this year’s elections, would give in to the Kabaka’s demand of federo! If this demand came from every corner of the country, that would put pressure on the Opposition to honour its promise. But it is clear that very few people out side Buganda would support the Kabaka’s federo demand even if a referedum was held on the matter.
For anybody familiar with Ugandan political history knows very well that Buganda does not have a very good reputation among other tribes. During colonial times, Buganda was a very great friend of the British! And it was through and with the help of Buganda that the British conquered the rest of the country and colonized it! So in most parts of Uganda, Buganda is identical or almost identical to the British oppressors! So it is very unlikely that the people there would give support the Kabaka’s demand for federo.
And what makes matters more complicated is that, reading between the lines, behind the federo demand, Buganda is really seeking «secession!» It is very clear that around the time of Uganda’s independence, Buganda never wanted to be part of Uganda. And to this end Buganda sent at least more than one Memoranda to the authorities in Britain! In September 1960, the Kabaka’s Lukiiko or parliament, presented a Memorandum to Queen Elizabeth II seeking Buganda’s independence! This Memorandum in part reads : «The Lukiiko’s Memorandum which explains in detail the constitutional plan for an independent Buganda is being prepared and will shortly be forwarded to Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom. We intend to divide this Memorandum into three main parts : a) Geographical and Historical background of Buganda; b) Buganda’s reasons for going it alone; and c) the Constitutional Plan.» Buganda still wants to go it alone! This should at least in part explain why Museveni cannot accept federo.
Buganda is the most developed region in Uganda and it is in fact the heart of the nation. The Administrative and Commercial Capital Kampala is in Buganda! Which political leader in his senses can accept the secession of the most important part of his country? So in my opinion even if the Opposition won this year’s Uganda elections, it would not give in to the Kabaka’s demand for federo! The Opposition is just exploiting the federo demand just to win the Buganda votes and so get itself in power. But it is unfortunate the Kabaka does not seem to see that they are just playing with him! After getting into power they would tell him exactly what Museveni has told him, «No Federo!»
So it is high time that Buganda woke up from the illusion and dream of federo at least at this point in history! The Kabaka’s political adivisers who advise him to insist on federo are not helping him. They are men seeking their own interests! And unfortunately many of the religious leaders who could have advised him better and also acted as a bridge between him and Museveni, they too appear to be consumed up by the desire for secession instead of unity of the country!
For sure the Kabaka being a citizen of Uganda, all his rights should be respected and he should not suffer any oppression from the Central government. And his complaints should be listened to. But it cannot be expected that every demand he makes has to be granted.
Anyone can see that the secession of Southern Sudan from the North is reasonable given the injustices and oppression suffered by the southerners over the years. But it is very difficult to see how the secession of Buganda from the rest of the country can be justified! If it is just because some Baganda and the Kabaka himself feel that he (the Kabaka) should have political power and restore a sense of pride they had in the past, that is really the wrong reason for divinding the country! No part of the country should be allowed to secede simply because some people want to have political power!
*Dominic Vincent Nkoyoyo, Monastery Val Notre-Dame, Canada.
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